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This paper discusses the global financial crisis of 2008/9 in thirteen countries, the ten new EU 
members that previously were communist and the three countries of Western former Soviet 
Union. Their problems were excessive current account deficits and private foreign debt, currency 
mismatches, and high inflation, while public finances were in good shape. The dominant cause 
was fixed exchange rates. Many lessons can be drawn from this crisis. A dollar peg makes no 
sense in this part of the world. The five currency boards in the region have lacked credibility. By 
contrast, inflation targeting has worked eminently. The euro has proven credible both in the 
countries that officially adopted it  and in the countries that adopted it unilaterally. With the 
exception of Hungary, all the countries in the region have displayed decent fiscal policies. No 
government should accept large domestic loans in foreign currency and they can be regulated 
away. The IMF has successfully returned to the original Washington consensus with relatively 
few conditions: a reasonable budget balance and a realistic exchange rate policy, while focusing 
more on bank restructuring. The most controversial issue is the role of the ECB. The ECB 
should facilitate the accession of willing EU members to the euro by relaxing the ERM II 




1. Introduction  
 
 
Central and Eastern Europe had a wonderful period of economic growth and stability from 1999 
until 2008.
1 It carried out an excellent transformation to capitalism, deregulating prices and trade, 
stabilizing prices, and privatizing state property faster than anybody could have imagined.  
The years 2000-8 represented a period of unprecedented economic growth. It is 
convenient to look upon the region as four subregions. The turbo-region was the three Baltic 
countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) that had an average unweighted annual growth of 7 
percent, peaking at 10 percent in 2006.
2 In 2006-8, Latvia saw an extraordinary spurt of an 
average 11 percent a year. Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova had a similar expansion of 7 percent. 
Central Europe (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and South-East 
Europe (Bulgaria and Romania) had a more moderate growth of 4.8 percent, but the region as a 
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1 Anna Borshchevskaya has provided me with valuable research assistance. I have benefited from comments at the 
CASE conference. 




Its fall was all the starker. In 2009, all countries except Poland are expected to 
experience large economic slumps, but the differences are evident. Although these transition 
countries have much in common, it is striking how differently they have come out in the current 
financial crisis. Poland will suffer no decline, while the other four Central European countries 
have moderate decline of around 5 percent of GDP. Bulgaria and Romania faced significant 
decline of 7-8 percent, while the Baltics with a 14-18 percent slump, and Moldova and Ukraine 
with some 12 percent have been very badly hit (figure 2). Why have the outcomes varied so 
greatly? 
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The purpose of this paper is to establish the nature and causes of the economic problem, 
survey the international response, and draw policy conclusions: What lessons can be drawn and 
what policies can help avoiding this situation in the future. Importantly, some countries suffered 
less, and Poland even grew. Thus, this historic episode offers an illuminating counterfactual 
narrative that is rarely evident.  
  The approach of this paper is regional, ten new EU members that previously were 
communist and the three countries of Western former Soviet Union. To be discussed are, in 
alphabetic order, 13 countries: Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. Only two (Slovenia and 
Slovakia) have adopted the euro. The countries of the former Yugoslavia and Albania had 




With its large currency reserves and persistent budget and current account surpluses, Russia is 
very different and therefore excluded. 
  
 
2.   What Was the Problem? 
 
 
The financial problems are easily detected from overall statistics. The immediate cause of the 
financial crisis was a so-called “sudden stop” (Calvo 1998, Edwards 2005). After the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, global liquidity froze, and the worst exposed 
countries, especially Ukraine and Latvia, found themselves beyond the range of global finance. 
Four symptoms of crisis were evident: excessive current account deficits, huge credit expansion, 
large capital inflows, and rising inflation (Goldstein 2007). 
The East European economic growth was originally export-driven (Åslund 2007), but 
increasingly all these countries ratcheted up ever larger current account deficits. In 2002, 
Estonia pioneered a double-digit current account deficit as a share of GDP and in 2007 six of 
these 13 countries had such deficits. They were Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, 
and Romania. Two of them, Bulgaria and Latvia had deficits exceeding 20 percent of GDP (table 





Table 1. Current Account Balance, 2000-2009 
Percent of GDP       
  2006 2007 2008
2009 
Forecast 
Czech Republic  -2,6 -3,1 -3,1 -2,1 
Hungary   -7,5 -6,4 -8,4 -3,0 
Poland   -2,8 -4,0 -5,5 -2,2 
Slovakia -6,2 -4,8 -6,5 -8,0 
Slovenia   -2,6 -4,2 -5,5 -3,0 
  
Bulgaria   -17,9 -25,4 -25,5 -11,4 
Romania   -11,8 -14,4 -12,4 -5,5 
  
Estonia -16,8 -18,0 -9,3 1,9 
Latvia   -22,7 -22,5 -12,6 4,5 
Lithuania -10,7 -14,6 -11,6 1,0 
      
Belarus   -3,9 -6,8 -8,4 -9,6 
Moldova   -11,7 -15,2 -17,7 -11,8 




Moldova is peculiar as much of its current account deficit was financed by remittances 
from Moldovans working abroad, but the other five countries were clearly vulnerable. The current 
account deficit gives a good indication of the countries with trouble, though Bulgaria has done 
better than the others. 
A frequent argument is that a current account deficit is not really dangerous as long as it 
is financed with foreign direct investment (FDI; Dabrowski 2008). This argument carries some 





Table 2. Current Account Deficit and Net Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 
2002-2007 
Percent of GDP       
      
  Net FDI CA Residual
Czech Republic  5,4 -4,2 1,2
Hungary 2,5 -6,9 -4,4
Poland 3,0 -3,0 0,0
Slovakia 7,5 -5,5 2,0
Slovenia 0,9 -1,8 -0,9
Bulgaria 11,6 -11,1 0,5
Romania 6,0 -8,3 -2,3
Estonia 6,9 -12,3 -5,4
Latvia 4,8 -14,4 -9,6




Table 2 shows that among the EU members only the three Baltic countries had current 
account deficits that were not financed with FDI by more than 5 percent of GDP. FDI more or 
less balanced the current account deficit in Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Poland, and 
Slovenia. The five countries with current account deficits not financed by FDI are the problematic 
ones: Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary, and Romania. This appears the single best means of 
singling out countries in crisis.  
  The current account deficits accumulated into an increasing foreign debt. By 2008, five 
countries had foreign debts amounting to more than 100 percent of GDP. These countries were 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, and Slovenia (figure 3).  
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Figure 3. Foreign Debt, end 2008
(percent of GDP)
Source: EBRD, Accessed October 28, 2009
 
 
The surprise here is that Slovenia, which has largely escaped crisis, was so exposed. Evidently, 
Slovenia was saved by its early adoption of the euro.  
All the most indebted countries also suffered from currency mismatches. Foreign 
currency, primarily euro, was used extensively for domestic loans, both corporate loans and 
household mortgages, because interest rates were significantly lower for foreign currency loans 
and borrowers did not expect any depreciation (figure 4).  
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Figure 4. Share of Foreign Currency Loans, 
2007
Source: Darvas, Zolt, and Jean  Pisani-Ferry (2008) “Avoiding a New European Divide,” Bruegel Policy Brief No. 10: 2, 
Brussels: Bruegel, December,  www.bruegel.org.
 
 
Yet, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia largely avoided such practices thanks to 
bank regulation, and this seems to have helped their financial sustenance. 
  The large capital inflows boosted the domestic money supply. As a natural result, 
inflation started rising again after disinflation in the early 2000s. In 2007 only two countries had 
less than 3 percent in annual inflation (Poland and Slovakia), while three had double-digit 
inflation, namely Latvia, Moldova, and Ukraine (figure 5).  
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Figure 5. Inflation, 2007
(percent end year)






Clearly, double-digit inflation was a recipe for disaster. The expansion of the money supply was 
even greater, for example 40-50 percent a year in Ukraine, but it did not result in more inflation 
because the demand for money and monetization grew sharply, and thus the velocity of money 
was steadily declining. 
  One big surprise has been how insignificant public finances have been in the crisis. The 
financial problems were concentrated to the interaction of the private sector with the 
international economy. Throughout most of this period, one single country, Hungary, suffered 
from a large budget deficit. Two countries, Bulgaria and Estonia, had significant budget 
surpluses of close to three percent of GDP. The other countries tended to hover close to budget 
balance (figure 6).  
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Figure 6. Average Budget Balance, 2005-2007
  (percent of GDP)
Source:  EBRD, Accessed on June 15, 2009; excluding Czech Republic; Czech Republic: 2005, EBRD Transition 




Thus their fiscal discipline was better than that of the European Union as a whole. Neither 
Bulgaria nor Estonia have needed an IMF program, and their persistent budget surpluses saved 
them, but even so they suffered big output slumps. 
  As a consequence, all these countries but Hungary had very limited public debts. Only 
Hungary’s public debt exceeded the Maastricht ceiling of 60 percent of GDP. For most countries, 
the public debt as a share of GDP fell steadily until 2008, when the average had fallen to 26 
percent (figure 7). 
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Figure 7.  Public Debt, 2008
(percent of GDP)
Source: EBRD, Accessed October 28, 2009 
 
 
  The conclusion of this survey is that a significant current account deficit that was not 
financed by FDI was bad. Another negative indicator was double-digit inflation caused by 
excessive credit expansion, and a third was a large share of domestic loans in foreign currency, 
while the state of public finances was good but did not save countries with a precarious foreign 
balance in the private sector. 
  
 
3.   Causes of the Financial Crisis 
 
 
So why did some countries end up with too large current account deficits, foreign debts, credit 
expansion, and inflation? The whole region was characterized by great openness both to foreign 
trade and finance. 
  Only Hungary suffered from irresponsible fiscal policy. Its fiscal mismanagement 
culminated in a budget deficit of 9.2 percent of GDP in the global boom year of 2006. Therefore 




The cause of the financial crisis was a long-lasting credit expansion that eventually 
became excessive, essentially in the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine. This credit 
bubble was financed with capital inflows, and the larger the share of bank credit as opposed to 
foreign direct investment, the worse the crisis became. Not all transition countries had such 
massive credit expansions. The outstanding exceptions were the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and 
Poland (Mitra, Selowsky, and Zalduendo 2009, 5). 
Central Europe, the subregion most integrated in the European Union, largely escaped 
the financial crisis (apart from fiscally-irresponsible Hungary). Thus, deep integration into the 
European economy appears to have been an advantage. The European Union, however, does 
not mark any dividing line, as evident by the Baltic countries being the worst hit. Nor did the euro 
zone. Poland has fared better than Slovakia and Slovenia.  
Postcommunist transition has not been negative. The Central Europeans were star 
reformers, and they did reasonably well. Looking at countries such as Ukraine and Romania, it 
easy to suggest that the reform laggards were doing worse, but that is hardly true because the 
Baltic countries were star reformers and they suffered the most (Åslund 2007). Moreover, most 
post-Soviet countries did not suffer much. Thus, the success of postcommunist transition does 
not appear to have been a central issue either way. 
  The dominant cause of the East European financial crisis of 2008-9 boils down to one 
single factor: the exchange rate policy. The countries in Central and Eastern Europe pursued 
five different exchange rate regimes.  
The first, reasonably successful group was the inflation targeters with floating exchange 
rate. This group includes Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania. The latter two 
ended up in financial crisis, but Hungary primarily because of a large fiscal deficit, and 
Romania’s economic policy was wanting in several regards. The overall analysis of Sebastian 
Edwards (2006) of inflation targeting stands: countries that have adopted inflation targeting have 
experienced less pass-through from exchange rate changes to inflation, and they have not faced 
any increased exchange rate volatility. 
Another successful group consisted of the two countries that had adopted the euro, 
Slovenia and Slovakia. They escaped capital flight, as the ECB guaranteed their financial 
stability and liquidity. Their problem was that their costs became disproportionately high relative 
to their competitors, such as Poland and the Czech Republic that undertook large devaluations, 
so their output fell significantly. 
The third group was worst hit. It consisted of the four countries with currency boards and 




Bulgaria. Before the crisis these four countries (beside Ukraine) were the most overheated 
economies with the largest current account surpluses and the highest inflation, and they suffered 
the greatest output falls. Clearly, these countries were the most vulnerable, and they received no 
support from the ECB. The currency boards lacked credibility. Admittedly, only Latvia has 
needed an IMF program, and Estonia and Bulgaria were helped by their persistent large fiscal 
surpluses. As none of these countries has devalued, it can be argued that the market operators 
were wrong in believing that they would be forced to devalue, but these states suffered 
materially from the belief of the marketers. 
The fourth group was also badly injured, the three non-EU countries that entered the 
crisis with a dollar peg, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. All three countries have adopted IMF 
programs and they have been forced to devalue. Their exchange rate and monetary policies 
made little sense. All three countries had simple pegs to the dollar, which had no particular 
planned exit, such as the adoption of the euro. The pegs were only remnants of a financial 
stabilization policy, which enjoyed popularity. They stand out as examples of “Fear of Floating,” 
countries that officially favor a floating exchange rate, but never get around to implement it 
(Calvo and Carmen Reinhardt 2002). 
Kosovo and Montenegro are outside of our region, but qualitatively they form a fifth group 
because they adopted the euro unilaterally, which granted greater credibility to their economies 
than to, for example, Bosnia, which had a currency board. The euro adoption had this stabilizing 
effect, although the ECB did not grant Albania or Montenegro any financial support.  
The starkest example of overheating because of short-term capital inflows was Ukraine. 
The dollar peg attracted excessive capital inflows, which increased by 40-50 percent a year from 
2002 to 2007. In spite of rising monetization, inflation rose to the double digits inflation in 2004, 
and in May 2008 inflation peaked at 31 percent year over year. The National Bank of Ukraine 
(NBU) was locked in an impossible situation as long as it did not let the exchange rate float. In 
April 2008, Ukraine had a refinance rate of only 16 percent a year and a negative real interest 
rate of 15 percent a year. Large currency inflows were provided by European banks with 
subsidiaries in Ukraine. They were caught in a speculative squirrel’s wheel. The high inflation 
allowed commercial banks to charge over 50 percent a year for certain consumer loans in 
hryvnia, which they could finance at about 6 percent a year in Europe. Large consumer 
expenditures boosted imports. As a consequence, trade and current account deficits expanded 
fast, as did private foreign debt (Åslund 2009a). 
Of the eight countries in the region with the highest inflation in 2007, we find all the seven 




was monetized and boosted inflation, and the central bank could do little as long as it maintained 
the peg. 
By contrast, Poland stands out as the true success, being the only EU country growing in 
2009, and it did so in every single quarter. The reasons for its success are multiple. Thanks to a 
floating exchange rate, its capital inflows were comparatively limited. The National Bank of 
Poland (NBP) was adamant about inflation targeting and maintained a very low inflation by 
keeping positive real interest rates when virtually all other countries failed to do so. The NBP 
leaned against the wind, when it perceived that asset prices, notably housing prices, were rising 
too steeply. Unlike other East European countries, Poland introduced special regulations to limit 
the volume of mortgages in foreign currency, which slowed their growth (Leszek Balcerowicz in 
Pisani-Ferry and Posen, 2009, 193). With its stellar monetary policy for many years, Poland 
could get away with a comparatively large budget deficit. Today, it is ironic to read Jiri Jonas and 
Frederick Mishkin’s (2005, 409) words: “Undershoots of the inflation targets have resulted in 
serious economic downturns that have eroded support for the central bank in both the Czech 
Republic and Poland.” Who would repeat such criticism today? 
The countries with currency boards or elementary pegs, the third and fourth groups, were 
caught in the “impossible trinity” of fixed exchange rates, free capital movements and 
independent monetary policy. Because of the fixed exchange rate and free capital movement, 
they could not pursue an independent monetary policy. Their interest rates were determined by 
the eurozone, which meant that their nominal interest rates were too low and their real interest 
rates negative. If these countries had hiked their interest rates, the effect would not have been 
monetary contraction but further attraction of short-term foreign capital given the fixed exchange 
rate (Åslund 2009b). 
The cases of Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus are not very interesting, because all these 
countries pursued an elementary policy mistake. They should have opted for floating exchange 
rates and inflation targeting as their pegs had not clear goal or exit, and they could have done so 
at any time. A peg without evident exit appears indefensible if inflation starts rising into the 
double digits. 
The three Baltic countries and Bulgaria are more intricate. The Baltic countries fixed their 
exchange rates when they adopted their currency board regimes in the aftermath of communism 
in 1992-4,3 and Bulgaria did so during its hyperinflation in 1997. In all four countries, the 
currency boards had proven highly successful. They had brought down inflation, provided a 
transparent monetary regime, and achieved high economic growth. None of these countries had 
                                                 




been tempted to pursue budget deficits. On the contrary, Estonia and Bulgaria had steady 
budget surpluses while Latvia and Lithuania had almost balanced budgets. The currency boards 
held during the Russian financial crisis in 1998. 
  The dilemma arose when the Baltic countries joined the European Union in May 2004.  
All three countries wanted to adopt the euro as soon as possible, which was natural as their 
national currencies were already tied to the euro. Estonia and Lithuania immediately joined the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) and Latvia did so in 2005. An EU country that 
wants to adopt the euro must belong to the ERM II for two years and fulfill a number of 
conditions before it can be allowed to adopt the euro. These conditions are: 
•  Average inflation rate one year prior to entry not exceeding the average of the lowest 
three inflation rates of the EU member countries by more than 1.5 percent. 
•  The average long-term nominal interest rate must not exceed the average of the 
corresponding rates of the three lowest inflation countries by more than 2 percentage 
points. 
•  The public sector deficit should not exceed 3 percent of GDP and public debt should not 
exceed 60 percent of GDP. 
The ERM II rules prescribe a currency band of +15%/-15% around a “stable but 
adjustable central rate to the euro” or a pre-announced, fixed exchange rate to the euro, but new 
entrants, the ECB and the European Union (the ERM II committee) can negotiate the exact 
exchange rate regime.
4 The Baltic countries wanted to enter the ERM II with their existing 
currency boards, presuming that they would be able to adopt the euro within two-three years. 
The ECB and EU accepted that, but they reneged on the standard ECB commitment to supply 
automatic and unlimited foreign exchange intervention and financing whenever an exchange 
rate in ERM II reached its fluctuation margins. At the time, nobody thought much about this, 
since the Baltic economies were Europe’s star performers, but it turned out to be extremely 
important. 
When the Baltic countries entered the EU, they received a huge and unanticipated 
capital inflow, which they had no possibility to stop as they had relinquished capital controls and 
had a fixed exchange rate. Lithuania had planned to adopt the euro from 1 January 2007, but 
the average annual inflation in Lithuania was marginally higher than the reference value 
established by the Maastricht Treaty because it included Sweden and Poland that were not euro 
countries. Therefore, in May 2006 the European Commission concluded that Lithuania was not 
allowed to adopt the euro (Lietuvos Bankas 2008). 
                                                 




Suddenly, inflation caught on, and the euro adoption strategy of the three Baltic countries 
was blocked. Admittedly, rather than thinking of an alternative strategy they were dizzy with 
success and weak coalition governments in Latvia and Lithuania could hardly hit the brakes. The 
IMF warned repeatedly about the overheating in the Baltics and elsewhere in eastern and 
southern Europe as did independent economists, but to no avail. For example, “By conventional 
standards, the external imbalances of many of the Central and Eastern European countries are 
large enough to justify serious concern” and they “stand out for having relatively small official 
reserves compared to their short-term external debt” (Schadler 2008, 38; cf Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti 2007).  Few listened in the midst of a tremendous boom. Yet the IMF also warned about 
large current account deficits in the euro area of Portugal, Spain and Greece, but there nothing 
happened. Many countries have actually managed large current account deficits for many years. 
In effect, the EU entry of the Baltic states put them in an untenable situation. Their 
decade-old currency boards had won public acclaim, and it was politically impossible to abandon 
them. Yet, their EU entry led to an excessive capital inflow, rendering control of inflation 
impossible, and because of their inflation they were not allowed to adopt the euro. The EU and 
the ECB had no solution to offer. 
A curious correlation is apparent between public debt and limited financial crisis. The 
underlying cause, however, is the exchange rate regime. All the four currency board countries in 
our sample (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria) have minimal debt because of the budget 
rules of a currency board regime. However, they were badly hit by the crisis because the 
currency board regime also implied fixed exchange rates, free capital flows, and thus no 
monetary policy. The conclusion is not that public debt is beneficial but that the exchange rate 




4.   International Financial Support: IMF and EU Cooperation 
 
 
The two central international organizations at the outbreak of the financial crisis in Central and 
Eastern Europe were the IMF and the European Commission. Before the crisis, it was not clear 
how they would act. Would the EC take the lead in EU member countries, or would the IMF do 




  In the event, it appeared quite easy and evident. At the annual meetings of the IMF and 
the World Bank around October 10, 2008, Hungary and Ukraine asked the IMF for financial 
assistance. The EC ceded to the IMF because the IMF had all that was needed: experienced 
staff, contractual procedures, controls, and large financing. Instead, the EC contributed with co-
financing of the IMF agreements. 
  Among the countries discussed here, so far, six have adopted new IMF standby 
agreements during this crisis. Hungary was the pioneer in October 2008, followed by Ukraine in 
early November. Latvia followed in December, Belarus in December, Romania in May 2009, and 
Moldova in October. 
  Quickly, a pattern developed. The EC co-financed IMF standby program for EU 
members, but it did nothing for the non-EU countries. In the case of Latvia, bilateral funding from 
individual European countries – the Nordic countries, Estonia, Poland and the Czech Republic – 
played an important role. As a consequence, the IMF provided only one third of the emergency 
funds to Latvia, while the EU committed another third, and friendly EU countries the rest. 
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova were left to the IMF, but China lent substantial bilateral clearing 
loans to Belarus and Moldova, and Russia offered slightly smaller bilateral credits. 
Three international financial institutions apart from the IMF played an important, 
supportive role, namely the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), and the European Investment Bank (EIB). All three expanded their 
lending and focused on the banking sector. 
The ECB played hardly any role. Unlike the US Fed, it provided no swaps to Central or 
Eastern European countries (only to Denmark and Sweden), though it did offer Hungary and 
Poland repurchase agreements in October and November 2008, respectively. They required 
highly liquid euro assets so they were of limited significance. Hungary drew on its credit line, 
while Poland turned to the IMF for a “Flexible Credit Line” facility instead. The ECB did provide 
substantial liquidity to European banks with subsidiaries in Central and Eastern Europe, but 
usually assistance is more effective if it goes directly to the target. 
  The IMF showed that it had learned its lessons from the East Asian crisis in 1997-98, and 
adjusted its behavior considerably. First, the IMF acted even faster than usual, cutting the time 
from application to delivery of funds to less than three weeks in the case of Hungary. Second, 
after all talk in the late 1990s of a post-Washington consensus with multiple structural conditions, 
the IMF went back to the original Washington consensus with a few elementary conditions, 




management, and energetic bank restructuring. Third, the IMF offered much more financing than 
before, a natural reaction to the greater financial globalization.  
  In the winter of 2008-9, great worry raged that the international financial institutions 
would run out of funding. Both the EU and the IMF reacted. The G-20 meeting in London on 
April 2, 2009, decided to quadruple IMF resources to about $1 billion, of which so far $170 billion 
has been committed. From the early 1990s, the EU had a facility for balance of payment support 
for EU member states of €12 billion. It was raised in two steps, first, to €25 billion and then to 
€50 billion. So far, only €14 billion has been committed to Hungary, Latvia, and Romania. Both 
organizations seem to have expanded their available financing far more than has as yet proven 
necessary, but then monetary and fiscal policies throughout the world have been far more 
accommodating than anybody could have anticipated. Ukraine, however, was left by the EU 
entirely to the IMF and other IFIs. The EU played almost no role to the east of the European 
Union, and the ECB did nothing. 
   As the crisis evolved, all growth forecasts and thus budget predictions deteriorated until 
the summer of 2009. This was true of both the IMF and the EU. However, the IMF made a very 
embarrassing error. In its important Global Financial Stability Report published in April 2009, the 
IMF presented ratios of foreign debt to reserves for the East European countries that were 
roughly twice as high as the real ratios.
5 It corrected its mistake, but in the October Global 
Financial Stability Report, the IMF left out the numbers in an apparent recognition of its 
weakness. The IMF undermined confidence in crisis countries at a critical time through an 
elementary arithmetic mistake. 
The IMF adjusted by accepting increasing budget deficits and allowing a large share of 
its funding to be used to finance budget deficits, while IMF loans usually refurbish the 
international currency reserves of the central banks. Some IMF loan tranches were delayed as is 
often the case when client governments do not comply with the agreed IMF conditions, but this 
was reasonably standard. 
The worst hiatus occurred in Latvia, where the quarterly tranche meant for March was 
not disbursed until the end of July. In this case, the Latvian government and the IMF had serious 
disagreements on the underlying numbers. In early June, the Latvian government foresaw a 
budget deficit of 9 percent of GDP in 2009, while the IMF mission predicted 15 percent of GDP. 
Eventually, the European Commission took the side of the Latvian government and decided to 
disburse on July 2, while the IMF mission made its decision on July 27. Moreover, the EU 
                                                 




disbursement was several times larger than the IMF tranche, so the EU and the IMF went 
separate ways with the EU taking the lead (Åslund 2009b). 
  
 
5.   Conclusion: Euro Adoption or Inflation Targeting 
 
 
Many policy lessons can be drawn from the East European financial crisis. At the time of this 
writing, the whole region is undergoing a remarkable economic recovery. There are all reasons 
to believe that this is just a repetition of the East Asian crisis of 1997-8, which was stark but 
brief. The single cause of both crises was pegged exchange rates, enticing excessive capital 
inflows and thus causing vulnerability to global disturbances. As the East Asian tiger model 
proved sturdy in the recovery, the East European capitalism is likely to prove its quality also in 
the future after this episode of financial crisis.  
The first and most obvious lesson is that a dollar peg makes no sense in this part of the 
world. An ordinary peg lacks credibility because the government has not committed itself to 
defend it, nor has anybody else. If any peg would be used, it should be denominated in the 
dominant trade currency, that is, the euro. Hopefully, dollar pegs have now disappeared from 
this region. 
Second, the five currency boards in Eastern Europe (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria 
and Bosnia) lack credibility. They attracted too large funds, leading to excessive current account 
deficits and inflation, but the capital flew out fast when global liquidity froze. Still, these countries 
have enhanced the credibility of their currency boards by standing firm. They deserve the euro 
and their euro adoption should be facilitated, as the IMF has argued.
6 Concretely, the ERM II 
period should be minimized, as it has become a stimulus of excessive capital inflows, thus 
destabilizing the euro candidates. 
Third, inflation targeting has proved to work eminently in Poland and the Czech Republic. 
The conclusion is that inflation targeting should be favored until an EU country can actually 
adopt the euro. As Jonas and Mishkin (2005, 410) put it: “even after EU accession, inflation 
targeting can remain the main pillar of monetary strategy…” it should be the obvious choice for 
countries such as Ukraine and Moldova. 
                                                 




Fourth, the euro has proven credible both in the countries that officially adopted it 
(Slovenia and Slovakia) and in the countries that adopted it unilaterally (Kosovo and 
Montenegro). It is quite an irony that financial operators perceive the monetary regimes of 
Kosovo and Montenegro are perceived as more credible than those of the virtuous Baltic 
countries. The euro on its own seems to award the euro countries sufficient credibility even 
without the support of the ECB. The obvious conclusion is that the expansion of the eurozone 
should be facilitated, though the overheating of Ireland that is reminiscent of the Baltics provides 
a caveat. Also within the eurozone capital flows to poorer countries tend to be very large, 
leading to excessive expansion of their money supply and thus overheating with high inflation 
(Ahearne, Schmitz, and von Hagen, 2008). 
Fifth, with the exception of Hungary, which never undertook a standard post-communist 
fiscal adjustment, all the countries in the region have displayed decent fiscal policies. Given the 
degree of overheating they should all have maintained significant budget surpluses, which only 
Estonia and Bulgaria did, but the standard feature of budget deficit because of pegged 
exchange rates have not been evident (Tornell and Velasco 1995). The main explanation is 
probably the Maastricht criteria or the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact as most countries wanted 
to adopt the euro early. An additional explanation is that all remained in shock by the fiscal 
destabilization after communism. 
A sixth obvious lesson is that no government should accept large domestic loans in 
foreign currency, especially not to consumers, and that they can be regulated away (Goldstein 
and Turner 2004, Goldstein 2007). This should no longer be a big problem. 
A seventh issue is not resolved: the dominant role in Eastern Europe by a dozen of West 
European commercial banks. These banks greatly contributed to the development of the East 
European banking sector before the financial crisis and the credit boom, but they were also the 
engines behind the overheating. Evidently, they were not sufficiently regulated by their domestic 
financial authorities or by East European regulators. This observation raises the demand for 
pan-European regulation of multinational banks (Zajc 2006, Haselmann 2006), which the EU is 
now acting on. When the crisis erupted, the worry was that the West European banks would cut 
their losses in the east and withdraw. Yet no single western bank has done so, suggesting that 
they see promising prospects after the crisis. They have also been helped by financial support 
from their home governments, and the international financial institutions have worked collectively 
with them to commit not only to stay but also to recapitalize their subsidiaries in the east. Thus 




An eight tentative conclusion is that the IMF has successfully returned to the original 
Washington consensus with relatively few conditions: a reasonable budget balance and a 
realistic exchange rate policy, while focusing more on bank restructuring. The IMF has also 
provided far more money than previously, seemingly heeding Jeffrey Sachs’s advice from the 
early 1990s. Its eventual success, however, depends on its staff’s skill in crisis management. 
The most controversial issue is the role of the ECB. With little doubt, the ECB has played 
a positive role within the eurozone by providing large and timely monetary expansion. Through 
the European commercial banks active in Eastern Europe, this monetary support has also 
benefited Eastern Europe, but only indirectly. A strong argument can be made that the European 
Central Bank has contributed to a greater divide between the eurozone and neighboring 
countries through its generosity to the insiders and stinginess to EU outsiders (Darvas and 
Pisani-Ferry 2008). The ECB has offered swap loans only to Denmark and Sweden, and not 
even to perfectly safe Poland or the Czech Republic, while the US Federal Reserve has offered 
large swap loans to many emerging economies (Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor 2008).  
Especially worrisome is how the ECB did little to warn and nothing to help the virtuous 
countries with currency boards. If the ECB had provided swap loans to the Baltic states by 
accepting government bonds denominated in local currencies of noneuro-area EU countries as 
collateral, as Darvas and Pisani-Ferry (2009) advocated, the Baltic financial crisis would in all 
probability have been contained. 
Through its spectacular inaction, the ECB has earned a black eye by not recognizing any 
regional responsibility. It is remarkable that the ECB paid no noticeable attention and undertook 
no action before, during or after the crisis. By not having tried to do anything to resolve the East 
European financial crisis it looks like a contributing cause, especially by offering flawed 
incentives in the ERM II. The rest of the world may wonder about its competence to manage 
European monetary affairs. As Pisani-Ferry and Posen (2009, 5) write:  
 
…the euro did little to improve the crisis response of neighboring countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe…. Even if the formal mandates of the [ECB] and the Eurogroup … do 
not formally include it, broader stability in the region should be a major economic and 








Posen (2009, 93) continues: 
  
The global financial crisis has if anything clearly displayed the geopolitical limitations on 
the euro’s global role because the euro area authorities have failed to show leadership 
even as a regional anchor currency. A successful regional currency role for the euro 
would entail fulfilling responsibilities toward countries in the region that have adopted the 
euro as a monetary anchor or whose financial systems are partially euroized. 
 
The big question going forward should be how fast and how to expand the euro. The 
overall answer is that all the EU countries in the region have a greater interest in adopting the 
euro because the crisis has proven the extreme danger of not having access to ECB liquidity, 
and euro countries with large current account deficits did well. The East European EU members 
fall into two categories, those with currency boards and those with inflation targeting.  
All the countries with currency boards want to adopt the euro as soon as possible. Today 
that should be much easier than before the crisis, when they all had sufficiently balanced 
budgets and low public debt. Their only hurdle was too high inflation, which has now 
disappeared. Their new, temporary problem is an excessive budget deficit, but the governments 
can cut it down and are intent on doing so. When that has been accomplished, these four 
countries should be let into the eurozone. Estonia can adopt the euro in 2011, according to the 
IMF, and the others are likely to follow earlier than 2013-4 that is now anticipated as their 
vigorous anti-crisis measures are likely to lead to a quick recovery. These countries should be 
given access to ECB credit swaps. 
For the inflation targeters, Slovakia stands out as the success model. Rather than 
pegging their exchange rates in a narrow band to the euro, the euro candidates should maintain 
the 15 percent band the ERM II allows. Then, the exchange rate can be adjusted when a 
country actually adopts the euro, as was the case with Slovakia. Yet, the ECB and the EU 
should consider a revision of the ERM II to offer a more sensible path to euro membership. First, 
the period of ERM II should be reduced. Second, at the very least a floor should be set for the 
inflation criterion to avoid the excessively harsh judgment the EU passed on Lithuania’s inflation 
in 2006 or present deflation. Third, ERM II countries should be given ample access to credit 
swaps in case of need (Pisani-Ferry and Posen 2009, 13; Darvas and Szapáry 2008; Darvas 
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